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THE UNIFORM DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACT.
SECTIONS 20 AND 21 OF THE DIVORCE ACT OF 1949
HAROLD MiARSH, JP.*
It is a trite bit of information that there exist in the United States
certain jurisdictions, such as Nevada and Florida, which will grant a
quick and easy decree of divorce to a person who desires to escape the
more stringent requirements of his normal place of abode, as to period
of residence or substantive grounds for divorce, and who is willing to
travel to such jurisdictions for a few weeks vacation. This is known
as a "migratory divorce'---that is, a divorce obtained by the appear-
ance of one or both of the spouses in the courts of a state with which
neither has any bona fide connection, other than the desire to utilize
for this one purpose the legal machinery of that state. The fact that
a certain number of persons attempt to flout the law of their domicile
in this fashion and that certain states are willing to aid them in their
attempt has created a situation which is not likely to be looked upon
with favor by the public officials of the remaining states.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Umversity of Washington.
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There are two methods by which this situation could be corrected
on the state level. If all states could be persuaded to adopt a uniform
substantive law of divorce, there would be little incentive for a person
to travel from his home to secure a dissolution of his marriage. How-
ever, this happy outcome is obviously highly improbable. The Uniform
Annulment of Marriage and Divorce Act proposed by a national con-
gress on divorce law in 19o6 was adopted in only three states. ' Sec-
ondly, if all states could be persuaded to adopt a uniform minimum
residence requirement for the institution of a divorce action, which was
a respectable period of time, the foreign divorce might still be easy
but would no longer be quick, and this would be a substantial deterrent
to migratory divorce. The possibility of securing such legislation in the
divorce-mill jurisdictions is obviously small, however, and unless it were
adopted in those jurisdictions the effect would be nil. Rather than
being a solution, this proposal is more in the nature of a wish that the
problem hadn't arisen, for if those jurisdictions had not lowered their
residence requirements and begun offering tourist divorces in the first
place the problem would not exist. The Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws proposed a Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act in 193o, but
it was adopted in only one state and was repealed two years later.2 It
has apparently been withdrawn at the present time.
The third possibility of action on the state level is, of course, action
by the domicil of the person securing a migratory divorce, to which
he normally returns once the painless operation is completed. This is
the "problem" with which the states and the United States Supreme
Court have been struggling for some fifty years. How can a state pre-
vent its domiciliaries from obtaining migratory divorce decrees? What
effect should be given to such a decree if, despite attempts to prevent
the practice, some citizens nevertheless persist in obtaining such
divorces? What effect must be given to it under the full faith and
credit clause of the federal Constitution? No answer has been given
to these questions which has not aroused vocal and widespread dissent.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have recently promul-
gated a proposed Uniform Divorce Recognition Act to deal with this
problem, and the state of Washington has become the first state to
1 Franklin, The Dilemma of Migratorv Divorces, 2 OKLA. L. REv. 151, 161, n. 50
(1948).2 The act was adopted in Vermont in 1931, but was repealed in 1933. 9 Unif. Laws
Ann. xii (1942). The latest pocket supplement to this publication does not list the
act at all.
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adopt this statute. It is incorporated in the Washington Divorce Act
of 1949, as Sections 20 and 21 thereof, which read as follows:
Sec. 20. A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force
or effect in this State if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this
State at the time the proceeding for divorce was commenced.
Sec. 21. Proof that a person obtaining a divorce from the bonds of matri-
mony in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within twelve
months prior to the commencement of the proceeding therefor, and resumed
residence in this state within eighteen months after the date of his departure
therefrom, or (b) at all times after his departure from this state and until
his return maintained a place of residence within this state, shall be prima
facie evidence that the person was domiciled in this state when the divorce
proceediig was commenced.
This statute raises numerous questions concerning its constitution-
ality, its interpretation, and the wisdom of its enactment, some of which
I shall examine in the following comment.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The statute raises serious constitutional questions in connection
with both its substantive and its procedural provisions. The latter will
be dealt with first. The effect of Section 21 is that proof of either of
the circumstances there specified is made "prima facie evidence" of
lack of donucil in the foreign jurisdiction8 and, therefore, of the in-
validity of the foreign decree of divorce. The meaning of this phrase
"prima facie evidence" is certainly far from clear. It might mean any
one of three things: Proof by the person attacking the foreign divorce
decree of either of the states of fact specified in this section (i) sustains
his burden of coming forward with evidence and permits him to escape
a directed verdict, but does not shift to the other party either the
burden of going forward or the burden of persuasion; (2) shifts to
the other party the burden of going forward with evidence of domicil
at the risk of a directed verdict, but does not shift the burden of per-
suasion; or (3) shifts to the other party both the burden of going
forward and the burden of persuasion on the issue of domicil. It is
fairly clear that this section was intended to accomplish at least. the
second of these things, and possibly the third,' although the language
3 The presumption is that the person was domiciled in Washington, but this neces-
sarily means that he was not domiciled in the foreign jurisdiction granting the divorce.
4 If only the first of these three possibilities were intended, presumably the section
would not alter emsting law, since proof of the facts stated should 'be "substantial
evidence" of no domicil (at least in almost all cases) under the present rules. But the
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chosen seems more appropriate to the first. However, I shall assume
that the apparent objective of the statute has been accomplished to
shift at least the burden of going forward with some evidence of don-
cil to the other party under penalty of a directed verdict. The above
analysis would not be applicable in terms, of course, where the subse-
quent suit in which the validity of the divorce was questioned was a
non-jury case; but the same basic questions, as to whether the statute
shifts the burden of going forward or the burden of persuasion or both,
would still exist.
Although the precise effect of the section is not certain, it is clear
that the intention was to place a procedural hurdle in the path of the
party relying upon a foreign divorce and to weight the scales, to some
extent, in favor of the party attacking it. Assuming that the section,
when the required facts are shown, shifts at least the burden of going
forward with evidence of domicil to the party relying on the foreign
decree, is it consistent with the full faith and credit clause of the
federal Constitution? No categorical answer to this question seems
possible; however, there are a number of expressions in the recent
divorce cases before the Supreme Court which throw some light upon
it. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in the Second Williams Case: "The
burden of undermining the verity which the Nevada decrees import
rests heavily upon the assailant."' And again, in Esenwein v. Penn-
sylvania, the same Justice stated. "The full faith and credit clause
placed the Pennsylvania courts under the duty to accord prima facie
validity to the Nevada decree."' And, finally, in Rice v. Rice Chief
Justice Vinson stated that "we have concluded that the Connecticut
Commissioners state that the adoption of this section would "alter the law of all states."
Brief of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, submitted to the American Bar
Association meeting, September, 1948, in support of the Uniform Divorce Recognition
Act, p. 10 (hereinafter cited "Brief of the Commissioners"). And all of the cases cited
by the Commissioners in support of this section involved "presumptions" which shifted
the burden of going forward or the burden of persuasion or both. Id. at p. 9; see note
11, snfra. Also, Professor Merrill, who was apparently one of the authors of this Act,
see note 28, infra, states "By the trend of authority the burden of showing that a
particular divorce is invalid for want of jurisdiction rests upon the one attacking the
decree. A properly drawn recognition statute could place the burden on the proponent
of the divorce." Merrill, Divorce Recognition Statutes, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 291, at 306
(1949).
5 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, at 233-34 (1945). "If this court finds
that proper weight was accorded to the claims of power by the court of one state in
rendering a judgment the validity of which is pleaded in defense in another state, that
the burden of overcoming such respect by disproof of the substratum of fact-here
domicile-on which such power alone can rest was properly charged against the party
challenging the legitimacy of the judgment we cannot upset the judgment before
us." Id. at p. 234.
6 Esenwein v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 325 U.S. 279, at 280 (1945).
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courts gave proper weight to the claims of power by the Nevada court,
that the burden of proving that the decedent had not acquired a domi-
cile m Nevada was placed upon respondent [the one challenging the
decree] ,"" and therefore that the judgment should be affirmed.
Of course, it is true that all of the statements quoted above are
dicta, since in each of these cases the Supreme Court found- that the
state court had given proper weight to the foreign decree. But it is
worthy of note that these statements were made in each instance by a
justice speaking for a majority of the court, and that the dissenting
justices in each case thought that greater effect should be given to the
foreign decree than the majority did. Furthermore, no justice stated
any disagreement with the view that the foreign decree must at least
be considered prima facie valid.
If Section 21 provided that the person relymg upon the foreign
decree must prove domicil in all cases, it seems safe to assume, from
these expressions, that it would violate the full faith and credit clause,
since it would make all foreign divorces prima facie invalid.8 How-
ever, the effect of this section is not to make all such decrees pre-
sumptively invalid, but only those where the specified conditions exist.
The person attacking the foreign decree would have the burden, in the
first instance, of proving the existence of the facts which raise the
statutory presumption of no domicil in the foreign jurisdiction (both
the burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion, presum-
ably). If it can be said that the existence of these facts, in all instances,
reasonably justifies an inference of no domicil m the foreign jurisdic-
tion, then it can be argued that the statute has merely prescribed the
quantum of proof with which the person attacking the decree must
come forward to disprove domicil, and has not really shifted the
burden of proving domicil to the other party This argument can be
tested by assuming for each of the alternative provisions of the statute
an extreme case which would suffice to raise the presumption.
Suppose H and W were domiciled in Washington on January 1, 1948,
and on that date H left Washington and went to Reno, Nevada. Six
weeks after arrival he brought suit for divorce against W and secured
a decree. He stayed in Reno until June 29, 1949, on which date he
returned to Washington. Proof of these facts would raise the presump-
7 Rice v. Rice, 69 Sup. Ct. 751, at 752 (1949).
8 See also Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, at 62 (1938), Milliken v: Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, at 462 (1941).
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tion, under Clause (a) of Section 21, that H was domiciled in Wash-
ington at the commencement of the divorce action.
Secondly, suppose H and W were domiciled in Washington on Janu-
ary 1, 1949, and on that date H left Washington and went to Reno,
Nevada. He retained his "place of residence" in Seattle.' Two years
after arrival he brought suit for divorce and secured a decree. In 1959
he returned permanently to Washington. Proof of these facts would
raise the presumption, under Clause (b) of Section 21, that H was
domiciled m Washington at the commencement of the divorce action.
It seems clear, from these examples, that it would be difficult to
justify the section constitutionally, in all cases to which it applies, on
the theory that it is a reasonable regulation of the quantum of proof
required to establish lack of domicil in the foreign state. This diffi-
culty is increased by the fact that in many cases the only evidence
which could rebut this presumption and permit the other party to
escape a directed verdict might be testimony by the person whose
domicil is in question as to his intent, but he may be dead or other-
wise unavailable at the time of suit.
Whether the section will be tested on the basis of the most extreme
cases to which it applies, or on the basis of the actual facts in the par-
ticular case in which its validity is challenged, probably depends on
the form in which the issue reaches the Supreme Court. If there is
dispute concerning the facts and the trial judge instructs the jury
generally in the words of the statute, then the Supreme Court may
reverse if in its opinion the section is unconstitutional as applied to
the most extreme case. On the other hand, if all other facts are ad-
mitted and the only question is that of domiciliary intent, then the
Supreme Court may restrict its consideration to the constitutionality
of the statute as applied to the particular facts of that case only
Assuming that a reasonable factual inference of lack of domicil
arises from the particular facts and the Supreme Court considers the
constitutionality of the statute only as applied to that case, it is stil7
by no means certain that this section will be upheld. The full faith and
credit clause prescribes a uniform policy requiring the several states to
respect the judgments of the courts in sister states. It is possible that
O It is difficult to say what would constitute "maintaining a place of residence"
within this state, so as to bring the case within this clause of the statute. If the person
securing the divorce retained ownership of a house in Washington, but rented it out.
probably the court would say that it was not his "place of residence" during that time.
If he retained ownership of his house and kept it locked up and unoccupied, presumably
this would be sufficient to bring the case within the statute.
COMMENTS
the Supreme Court will say that this policy prohibits a state, in any
case, from establishing a presumption which shifts to the party relying
upon a foreign judgment the burden of showing jurisdiction, or, in
other words, that the overriding policy of the full faith and credit
clause prohibits the establishment of even a reasonable factual pre-
sumption which tends to undermne that policy 10 If a state attempts
to weight the scales in favor of the party attacking a foreign divorce,
has it given "full" faith and credit to the foreign decree? 1
Section 21 thus seems to be of doubtful constitutionality as applied
to some cases within its terms, and its constitutional validity in any
case is at least open to question. This section was unnecessary in Wash-
mgton, since the Washington Supreme Court has shown no hesitancy
in invalidating foreign divorces where it was evident that the jurisdic-
tional requisites were lacking."2 Therefore, an attorney who is attempt-
ting to establish the invalidity of a foreign divorce decree would do
well to ignore this clause, and to avoid any instruction to the jury
based upon it. Without the presumption, if there was in reality no
doncil, he can probably succeed m establishing that fact without
difficulty in view of the attitude of the Washington court. If he gets a
judgment which is based in part upon Section 2 1, he is merely inviting
a possible reversal by the United States Supreme Court.
10 Compare Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)-validity of a presumption
under the equal-protection clause.
11 The Commissioners' brief contains only the following statement in support of the
constitutionality of Section 21 "The reasonableness of the inference of no change of
domicil under the circumstances prescribed by the statute seems clearly to render the
section constitutional under such decisions as Mobile, J. & K C. R. R. v. Tunipseed,
219 U.S. 35 (1910), Yee Henm v. U.S., 268 U.S. 178 (1925), Bandini Pet. Co. v.
Sueriort t., 284 U.oces. 8ue ( Atlmetic CoastLinen .R.hvnFord, 287 U.S. 502(193),Moriso v.Calforia,288U.S 59 (133)(mei. p. iscussed in Morrison
v. aliorna, 91 .S.82 193))." rie oftheComissonesp. 9. None of these
cass ctedinolvd aforig diorc dcre, nne f heminvlvd any question under
theful fath nd redt c us. Al o thse ase cocered he uesion whether a cer-
tainstautoy pesuptin ws ivali uner ithr te de poces clause or the equal
proecton laue.Fro th fat hata rasoabe lgisatie resumption does not
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nothing follows as to
whether a statutory presumption (reasonable or unreasonable), which derogates from
the potency of a foreign judgment, violates the full faith and credit clause. And, assum-
ing that these cases indicate that Section 21 is constitutional if the inference from the
facts required to be established to lack of doucil is a "reasonable" one, there is no
argument in the Commissioners' brief to support the reasonableness of this inference.
That is assumed as something given, but, as has been demonstrated above, the assump-
tion is inaccurate-the inference is in fact unreasonable in some of the cases in which
it would be raised.12 See It re Medbury, 192 Wash. 462, 73 P. (2d) 1340 (1937) ("To hold that the
appellant went to Wyoming with the bona fide intention of establishing there a perma-
nent abode, would be a very great tax upon credulity."), Mapes v. Mapes, 24
Wn.(2d) 743, 167 P.(2d) 405 (1946) ("Domicil has a larger meaning than an ex-
pressed desire to find work and get a divorce.").
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Section 20 provides that a foreign divorce decree shall be of no force
or effect in this state, if both spouses were domiciled in Washington at
the time the divorce suit was commenced in the foreign state. Since
under common-law theory a person can have only one domicil, this
would necessarily mean that neither was domiciled in the state grant-
ing the decree. Is this section constitutional? Insofar as foreign ex
parte divorces are concerned, it would appear to be clearly constitu-
tional, since the United States Supreme Court held in the Second
Williams Case" that the domicil of at least one spouse in the state
granting a divorce decree was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a decree
entitled to full faith and credit, and that this jurisdictional fact of
domicil could be relitigated in another state upon the basis of a record
made there.
Suppose, however, that H and W are both domiciled in Washington.
W goes to Reno and files suit for divorce; H enters an appearance in
the action and contests the suit, but a divorce is nevertheless granted
to W Neither spouse in fact acquired a bona fide domicil in Nevada.
In subsequent litigation between H and W, one of them attempts to
attack the validity of the Nevada decree, offering to prove that both
were domiciled in Washington at the time the proceeding was com-
menced. The statute attempts to permit this attack, since this section
makes no distinction between ex parte and contested divorces and to
prohibit the attack would give the foreign decree some "force or effect"
in Washington. But the United States Supreme Court held in Sherrer
v. Sherrer" that a state could not constitutionally permit an attack by
one of the spouses upon a foreign decree of divorce, where both were
present before the foreign court and litigated the issue of jurisdiction,
and the question arose in subsequent litigation between the same
parties. Therefore, this section is to this extent unconstitutional. 5
The extent of the contest which must be made in the foreign juris-
diction for the doctrine of Sherrer v. Sherrer to be applicable is by no
means clear as yet," nor whether that doctrine would apply in any
subsequent suit except one between the spouses who appeared in the
"3 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
14 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
'5 The fact that Washington now has a statute expressing the state policy with
respect to migratory divorces will not distinguish this case from Sherrer v. Sherrer,
because there was a Massachusetts statute in that case which purported to permit such
attack and which was held pro tanto unconstitutional.
10 See the discussion in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 356-77 (1948).
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foreign divorce action. 17 For example, if one of the parties to the
foreign contested divorce purported to contract a second marriage, and
later attempted to secure an annulment from his second "spouse," it
is not clear whether Sherrer v. Sherrer will be extended to prohibit him
from showing the invalidity of the foreign divorce in which he partici-
pated. The explicit rationale of that case, the doctrine of res judicata,
would not be applicable in the assumed case. But whatever scope is
given to the doctrine of Sherrer v. Sherrer, to that extent Section 20 IS
unconstitutional."
INTERPRETATION
In the remainder of this paper, I shall consider only foreign ex parte
divorces (where the divorce defendant neither enters an appearance
in the action nor is personally served within the jurisdiction), with the
understanding that what is said applies also to foreign contested
divorces to whatever extent the statute can constitutionally be applied
to such divorces. The next problem to be considered is what effect
Section 20 has upon existing law in those instances in which it can
constitutionally be applied. The easiest way in which' to show tins
effect is to state a number of hypothetical cases, and to see what the
result would be under the common law and under the statute.
Suppose H and W are domiciled in Washington, and H goes to Reno
and secures a migratory divorce. After his return to Washington, H
goes through a purported marriage ceremony with W2, and thereafter
lives with her for twenty years. W dies intestate, leaving considerable
separate property H applies to the administrator of W's estate for a
share of this property under the statute of distribution as the surviving
spouse of W He offers to prove that he was never domiciled in Nevada,
therefore, his divorce from W was void and his "marriage" with W2
was also void; consequently, he was the husband of W at the time of
her death. Can H succeed in this attempt? By the weight of authority,
17 See the list of the situations wiuch may possibly fall outside the scope of the
Sherrer doctrine m Brief of the Comnnssioners, pp. 5-6. This list should not be accepted
uncritically. The Commissioners are apparently intent upon limiting the Sherrer doc-
trine as narrowly as possible; the Supreme Court may not be.
Is The Commissioners recognize in their brief that Section 20 is unconstitutional
insofar as it conflicts with Sherrer v. Sherrer But, since the scope of that decision is as
yet uncertain, they say that "A broad phraseology of this section enables the states to
maintain control over questions concerning marital status of their domiciliaries to the
fullest extent that later decisions of the Supreme Court may indicate is permissible."
Brief of the Commissioners, p. 6. And that "recognition to extra-state divorces obtained
by domiciliaries should be refused except as specifically required by the Constitution of
the United States, since any narrower policy both would be difficult to formulate and
would introduce factors so complex as to endanger the goal of uniformity." Id. at p. 2.
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he cannot at common law, on the theory that he cannot attack the
validity of the decree which he himself procured.1" He has made his
bed, and the courts require him to lie in it. Under the statute, he can
succeed, since to refuse to permit him to attack the decree would give
it some "force or effect" in Washington.
Suppose H and W are domiciled in Washington, and H goes to Reno
and secures a migratory divorce. After his return to Washington, H
goes through a purported marriage ceremony with W2, and thereafter
lives with her for ten years. Tiring of this arrangement, H deserts W2
and refuses to support her. She sues for a decree of separate mainte-
nance and, as a defense to this action, H seeks to prove that the Nevada
divorce is invalid and consequently he is not married to W2. Will H be
permitted to establish this defense? Under the common law, it follows
from the principle referred to in the preceding case that he will not. 0
Under the statute, he will, since to refuse to permit him to attack the
decree would give it some "force or effect" in Washington.
Suppose H and W are domiciled in Washington, and W goes to Reno
and secures a migratory divorce. Thereafter, H, relying upon this Reno
divorce, goes through a purported marriage ceremony with W2, after
assuring her that he has been validly divorced from his former spouse.
Later tiring of this arrangement, H sues W2 for a decree of nullity of
their marriage on the ground that he was never validly divorced from
his former wife. Can he succeed? Under the common law, by the weight
of authority, he cannot; he has elected to rely upon the validity of the
foreign decree by his remarriage and he will not be permitted later to
19 Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 749, at 770-78 (1936),
Harper, The Validity of Void Divorces, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 158, at 174-75, 183 (1930),
Merrill, supra note 4, at 296-97, Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 112 (1934), Starbuck
v. Starbuck, 173 N.Y. 503, 66 N.E. 193 (1903). The Washington Supreme Court this
year squarely adopted the rule of the Starbuck case for the first time in In re Tamke's
Estate, 133 Wash. Dec. 88, 204 P.(2d) 526 (1949), although this holding was fore-
shadowed in Wampler v. Wampler, 25 Wash.(2d) 258, 170 P.(2d) 316 (1946). The
rule of the Tainke case is, of course, now abrogated by Section 20 of the Divorce Act.
20 Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E. (2d) 290 (1940) "We cannot lose sight
of the fact that the present defendant was himself the party who had obtained the decree
of divorce which he now asserts to be invalid and repudiates in order that he may now
disown any legal obligation to support the plaintiff, whom he purported to marry." Also
"it is not open to defendant in these proceedings to avoid the responsibility which he
voluntarily incurred." This precise situation has not arisen in Washington, but it seems
probable that the Washington court would have reached the same conclusion as the
New York court in Krause v. Krause, had it not been for the intervention of the
statute under discussion, in view of the broad ground upon which the court rested its
holding in the Tainke case, supra note 19" "we think the opinion in this case should
rest, and we do rest our holding, on the general rule hereinbefore stated, that although
a decree or judgment is invalid in another state as an independent proposition, its
invalidity may not be raised in this state by the party at whose instance and in whose
favor it was rendered, under conditions such as those shown to exist in this case."
133 Wash. Dec. at 103, 204 P.(2d) at 534 (1949).
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repudiate it.2 Under the statute, he can 'succeed, since to refuse to
permit him to attack the decree would give it some "force or effect" m
Washington. 2
Suppose H and W are domiciled in Washington, and W goes to Reno
and secures a migratory divorce. H and W had no children. There-
after, H goes through a purported marriage ceremony with W2, and
they live together for twenty years and have three children, X, Y, and
Z. W2 dies. Thereafter, H dies intestate, leaving a considerable estate,
and X, Y, and Z are his only relatives. W files a claim in the adminis-
tration of H's estate, not merely for a surviving wife's share where
there are children, but for all of the estate. She claims this on the
ground that she was never validly divorced from H, and therefore is
his surviving wife; that consequently he was never married to W2
and therefore X, Y, and Z are bastards and cannot inherit from H,
since he never acknowledged them in writing as required by the Wash-
ington statute of distribution. Can she succeed in this attempt? Under
the common law, upon the grounds previously pointed out, she cannot.
Under the statute, she can succeed, because not to permit her to prove
the invalidity of the foreign decree would give it some "force or effect"
in Washington. Nor would Section 6 of the Washington Divorce Act of
1949 apparently be of assistance to X, Y, and Z. That section provides
that "children conceived or born during the existence of a marriage of
record which is later declared vozd, shall be legitimate children of
both parents notwithstanding the annulment of such marriage. "
(Italics added) That section seems to refer to voidable, not void,
marriages; to annulment, not decree of nullity-concepts which are
clearly differentiated in other sections of the same Act and elsewhere
in the Washington statutes.
21 Jacobs, supra note 19, at 799-800; Harper, supra note 19, at 174, 183, Merrill,
supra note 4, at 297, Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 112 (1934) , see also Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, 1948 Supplement, p. 110. In a situation like this, where the non-
appearing divorce defendant who had remarried was attempting to claim part of his first
wife's estate, the Minnesota court said. "He may publish his own shame to the world for
a money consideration, but this court will not aid him to stigmatize his second wife as
living an adulterous life, nor hold her child is a bastard." Marvin v. Foster, 61 Minn.
154, 160, 63 N.W 484, 486 (1895).
22 The New Jersey court has stated with respect to a similar statute: "But in this
case, the answer to the claim of estoppel is not that the estoppel does, not exut, but
that it cannot exist. Is it not clear, therefore, that there cannot be any estoppel
against the contention of complainant that the Nevada decree is, -as the legislature has
said, 'of no force or effect in this state'?" Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 91 N.J. Eq.
261, 267, 110 A. 19, 22 (N.J. Ch. 1920). And the Massachusetts court remarked. "It is'
settled that in a case within the statute the divorce is to be treated here as void for all
purposes." Andrews v. Andrews, 176 Mass. 92, 96, 57 N.E. 333, 335 (1900).28 R.. Rnv. STAT. § 1345 [P.P.C. § 199-13].
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These examples could be multiplied. But it should be sufficiently
clear that, if effect is given to the plain meaning of the statute, anyone
at any time can now attack the validity of a foreign decree of divorce
in Washington, insofar as he is not prohibited from doing so by the
full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution. It may be ob-
jected, however, that the statute was not intended to accomplish the
results stated above, despite the fact that an argument can be made
that they follow from a literal reading of its language. On the con-
trary, it seems that these were precisely the results which were in-
tended. In their brief submitted to the American Bar Association in
support of tlus statute, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
say- "A number of decisions refuse to allow attack upon the validity
of a foreign divorce by one who obtained it, or who has appeared in
the proceedings brought against him; with or without contesting the
foreign court's jurisdiction, or who has assented to the divorce or has
neglected to attack it for a considerable time [cases cited] The enun-
ciation of policy proposed by this section will close, to the extent
permitted under the Coe and Sherrer cases, supra, the door to evading
the [in]validity of the tourist divorce which the decisions first cited
above leave ajar.""' The meaning of this statement is fairly apparent
upon close examination. It means simply this: This statute permits
any person to attack a migratory divorce at any time, regardless of
how inequitable it may be to permit him to do so.25
It may also be objected that the illustrations selected above give a
distorted picture of the effect of the statute. Under the statute it would
also be possible for persons to attack the validity of a migratory divorce
who had not participated in obtaining it and who had not relied upon
it or induced others to do so. For example, the state could prosecute
either of the parties to such a divorce for bigamy if they attempted to
remarry; a spouse who in no way participated in the obtaining of the
decree nor relied upon it could still assert his or her legal rights as
spouse; etc. This is true. But it was also true in Washington before the
24 Brief of the Commissioners, pp. 7-8. It is apparent that the word "validity" is a
typist's error for "invalidity." The statement is meaningless if the word "validity" is
allowed to stand.
25 The Commissioners at one point make the statement that "Of course, even under
a nonrecognition statute, exceptions may be made in proper cases," citing a Massa-
chusetts case which held that where the wife entered into a collusive agreement with
her husband to procure a foreign divorce, she "connived" at his subsequent "adultery"
with his second "wife" and could not allege it as a ground for divorce. Langewald v.
Langewald, 234 Mass. 269, 125 N.E. 566 (1920) But this statement is contrary to the
whole tenor of their argument, and it is certainly clear that any "exception" could only
be made, under this statute, in the teeth of the statutory language.
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enactment of tis statute.2" The only change in the law which Section
20 makes, if it makes any at all, is in those cases discussed above and
other similar cases. Therefore, the statute must be judged, in this state
at any rate, as though it applied specifically to such cases and only
to them.
THE WISDOM OF THE STATUTE
Most discussion of migratory divorce seems to start off with an as-
sumption that divorces are desirable or undesirable, and proceeds from
there without questioning that basic assumption. This situation is
probably inevitable; the problem impinges so directly upon basic
religious, ethical, and political beliefs that the basic attitude of most
persons toward it probably rests more on emotional conviction than
rational justification, and could not be changed by argument. I shall
assume, in evaluating this statute, that migratory divorce is an "evil,"
since that is apparently the position of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the Washington legislature. In fact7 I think most per-
sons would agree that, if one could by an exercise of will prevent any
person in the future from attempting to secure a migratory divorce, it
should be done.
Acceptance of tis premise does not by any means require approval
of Section 20, however. It is assumed, apparently, that a person who
secures a migratory divorce is antisocial and deserving of punishment.
Therefore, a statute is passed permitting anyone at any time to ques-
tion the validity of his migratory divorce. But how is he "punished"
by permitting him to return to the state, remarry and later escape his
second "marital" obligations, and to share in the estate of the first wife
whom he has abandoned? It may be objected, however, that under the
statute the state can prosecute him for bigamy if he returns and re-
marries. This is true, but it also could before the statute was enacted.17
The only change made in the law by the statute, it must be repeated,
is to permit persons to challenge the validity of migratory divorces in
26Dormitzer v. German Savings & Loan Soc., 23 Wash. 132, 62 P 862 (1900),
aff'd, 192 U.S. 125 (1904), Dailey v. Dailey, 154 Wash. 499, 282 P 830 (1929), In re
Medbury, 192 Wash. 462, 73 P. (2d) 1340 (1937), Mapes v. Mapes, 24 Wn. (2d) 743,
167 P. (2d) 405 (1946), Maple v. Maple, 29 Wn. (2d) 858, 189 P. (2d) 976 (1948).
27 There does not appear to be any case in Washington involving a prosecution for
bigamy, but it necessarily follows, from the decisions cited in note 26, supra, and the
Second Willia m Case, that the state could prosecute. It may be objected that a prose-
cution for bigamy could easily be avoided by having the marriage ceremony performed
in another state. The remedy for this situation, if one is desired, is to pass a statute
punishing "bigamous cohabitation" as well as bigamy, as has North Carolina (this was
the statute under which the ill-fated Mr. Williams was indicted).
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circumstances where the courts have previously held that it was in-
equitable for them to do so.
Professor Merrill, who was apparently one of the principal authors
of the statute,2 makes the following comment in this connection. "A
statute, phrased with proper breadth, may be used to close the loop-
holes in the wall of state control which have been bored by the various
doctrines, already reviewed, of disqualification and estoppel to question
the validity of divorcements decreed without jurisdiction."29 This
statement is hardly convincing, to say the least. He brands as "loop-
holes" these doctrines, which are merely rules worked out by the courts
over a long period of years in an attempt to do elementary justice
between the parties. From there on everything is clear sailing. What
does one do with a "loophole"? Why, one plugs it, of course. There-
fore, let's pass a statute "plugging" these "loopholes." But Professor
Merrill does not demonstrate that the results reached by these rules
are unjust or socially undesirable. They are condemned with a word-
"loopholes."
A final argument made by the Commissioners in support of tins
statute is that its sweeping declaration of invalidity will prevent per-
sons from even attempting to secure rmgratory divorces, and that
henceforward no "respectable lawyer" will advise his clients to go to
Reno for a divorce."0 This argument raises a number of interesting
questions. How many "respectable lawyers" before this statute was
enacted advised their clients to get migratory divorces? If the threat
of punishment of the person desiring the migratory divorce (e.g., by
a prosecution for bigamy if he remarries) has not prevented him from
securing the decree, why is there reason to think that a threat to
punish innocent third parties (perhaps to his advantage) will do so?
Do the Commissioners have any reliable statistics which indicate that
fewer New Yorkers per year went to Nevada or Florida to get divorces
during the reign of Haddock v. Haddock than before or since? Do they
have any reliable statistics that more residents of Kansas (where even
28 See Merrill, supra note 4, at 291, footnote to the title. The author acknowledges
assistance in research "upon which both this article and the drafting of the Uniform
Divorce Recognition Act were founded."
29 Id. at 307
80 Brief of the Commissioners, p. 9" "A further effect upon the existing law 'in
action' is that the legislative declaration of policy specifically denying recognition to
'tourist divorces' may cause seekers after freedom to consider seriously whether they
can acquire a valid divorce before setting out on their journey. Certainly, it will pre-
vent any respectable lawyer from advising that they invoke the jurisdiction of an extra-
state court without change of domicil."
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the question of domicil cannot be relitigated 1 ) per thousand popula-
tion have, through the years, gone to Reno for a divorce than have
residents of Massachusetts (which has a "non-recognition" statute
similar to the one they are proposing)? So far as I know, no rational
basis exists for believing that the rules of law of a state concerning.
the "faith and credit" to be given to a foreign divorce decree have any
effect in encouraging or discouraging its domiciliaries from securing
migratory divorces. Surely, it would have been wise to make a careful
study of the effect, if any, which the "nonrecognition" statutes of
Massachusetts and a few other states have had in discouraging migra-
tory divorces, before proposing such a statute for nationwide adop-
tion. 2 Perhaps such a study was made; if so, the Commissioners do
not advert to it.
No valid excuse can be found for the enactment of this statute in
Washington. There was no reason to be dissatisfied with the manner in
which the Washington Supreme Court was handling this problem,
whereas the statute will frequently be unjust in its application-it will
punish innocent third parties and bastardize children in order to ex-
press disapproval of persons who secure, migratory divorces. The legis-
lature should repeal Sections 20 and 21 of the Divorce Act at its next
session and permit the court to handle this problem until such time as
a demonstrable need for legislative intervention arises.
81 Merrill, .supra note 4, at 300-301.
82 Professor Merrill says, of the existing "non-recognition" statutes in Maine.
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Wisconsin: "The record of the administration of these
statutes, contained in the adjudicated and reported cases, indicates that they have been
effectively used to the extent that their terms make them applicable. Thus the cases
are numerous in which divorces have been invalidated. " Merrill, supra note 4, at
302. These two statements, that the statutes are effective and that the cases "are
numerous," seem to me to be contradictory assertions. He cites twenty-five or thirty
cases from Massachusetts and New Jersey, in which the existence of such a statute
has apparently not prevented residents of those two states from securing migratory
divorces.
